Implementation of risk management in the Australian public university sector: Insights from a collective action model of institutional innovation by Sarens, G. & Christopher, Joseph
Implementation of Risk Management in the Australian Public University Sector:  





Joe Christopher  
Curtin University of Technology 
School of Accounting 
P.O Box U1987,  
Perth (Western Australia) 
Phone: +61 8 926 62006 




Université Catholique de Louvain  
Louvain School of Management 
Place des Doyens, 1 
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium) 
Phone : +32 10 47 84 41 



























Adoption of Risk Management in the Australian Public University Sector:  
Insights from a Collective Action Model of Institutional Innovation  
 
Abstract 
Australian public universities are experiencing a ch nge towards a corporate culture. This 
change process involves the adoption of a range of corporate control processes to facilitate 
effective governance. This study examines the extent to which one of these processes, risk 
management, is adopted under an environment of change management. The study draws on a 
collective action model of institutional innovation as the theoretical framework and utilizes a 
qualitative research methodology to analyse the extnt of the adoption of this process. The 
findings confirm the theoretical propositions of the model and illustrates that specific actors in 
the sector frame issues, mobilize collective actions, and engage in contested processes in order to 
achieve different outcomes in the implementation of risk management. The study has provided 
insights into these different outcomes and suggests that an important causal factor is the different 
levels of impact of an organization’s wider influencing forces on the governance paradigm and 
consequently the various drivers and owners of the process. The study identified these different 
wider influencing forces and provides avenues for fu ther research to test the theoretical 
proposition that universities need to recognize these wider influencing forces within their 
governance framework and address them to minimize tensions or conflicts in developing and 
implementing its governance processes.  
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Implementation of Risk Management in the Australian Public University Sector:  




Australian public universities as public universities of developed countries have 
experienced significant changes in their operating e vironment. They have emerged from a 
sheltered risk free existence supported by funding from the government into a global educational 
market competitor characterized by a need to more actively generate their own constituencies and 
resources (Parker, 2011). This had led to an increased complexity in its operations which in turn 
led to a requirement for more professionalism and accountability of university management. The 
Commonwealth Government, as the main stakeholder, had introduced a range of policies through 
a set of governance protocols encouraging a transformation to a more accountable entity 
(Australian Government, 2003). This had led to an emphasis towards corporate managerialism 
and the adoption of corporate governance control prcesses. One of these controls within the 
corporate governance model relates to risk management, which involves processes put in place to 
identify and manage risks associated with the operations of the university. The characteristics of 
good risk management practice are reflected in current corporate sector governance guidelines 
and risk management standards (e.g. ASX, 2007; ISO 31000).   
The extent of guidance provided by the governance protocols relative to risk management 
is, however, limited to requiring universities to include a report on risk management in their 
annual report. There is no specific guidance as to how risk management is to be developed and 
implemented in universities or any reference made to xisting risk management standards or 
corporate governance guidelines to be complied with. Furthermore, as a consequence of the 
Bradley Report (2008), compliance with the protocols is not mandatory. It is at best a good 
practice guideline.     
Given the above scenario, it is uncertain to what extent Australian public universities have 
developed and implemented appropriate risk management practices. The current literature on 
university governance research is limited to identifying and/or discussing governance models at 
the higher conceptual level (e.g. Clark, 2004; Amaral et al, 2002; Marginson and Rhodes, 2002; 
Besant, 2002; Marginson and Considine, 2000; Braun, 1999; Vidovich and Currie, 2011). There 
is very little research undertaken on transforming the broad issues of governance to the operating 
levels or examining the adoption of important governance processes within the university sector. 
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This study addresses this research gap by examining the extent to which risk management 
practices, as an important governance control process, have been developed and implemented in 
Australian public universities. The consequent research question is: To what extent are risk 
management practices developed and implemented in Australian public universities? The 
underpinning theoretical framework applied is the collective action model of institutional 
innovation (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006) which provides a relevant framework for the study 
of institutional change or innovation relative to the adoption of new processes and or factors 
impacting its adoption.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Firstly, a brief overview of the Australian 
public university sector and its current operating environment is provided as the context of the 
study. Secondly, the literature on risk management and its significance to governance of 
corporations is provided. Thirdly, Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2006) collective action model of 
institutional innovation is discussed as the underpinning theory on which this study is based. The 
fourth section outlines the research methodology. In the fifth section, the results are presented. 
The final section formulates a discussion and conclusion for this study.  
 
The Australian public university sector 
The Australian public university sector consists of 37 universities and is a multi-billion 
dollar revenue generator for the country. In 2008, the sector was responsible for contributing 15 
billion dollars to the Australian economy, thus ranking it as the third largest export industry of 
Australia (Birell and Smith, 2010). The main cause for its rapid expansion since the 1980’s was 
the globalisation of education services as a result of global labour market priorities (Marginson 
and Considine, 2000; Clark, 1998, 2004; Meek, 2002). This global phenomenon of expansion 
from ‘elite’ to a mass system of education had led to an increased level of management 
complexity in its operations (Coates et al., 2009; Meek, 2002). The consequent change to this 
complex operating environment created a need to professionalise university management and its 
importance was highlighted by the Hoare Report on university governance (Hoare, 1995).  
The need to address the concerns of the Hoare report was already set in motion by the 
Dawkins report (1989) which set the foundation for a more managerial approach which was in 
essence influenced by broader public sector reforms during this period (Harman, 2001; Meek, 
2002). This new managerial approach was also referred to as a corporate or entrepreneurial 
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approach. Here, the emphasis was towards New Public Management (NPM), market based public 
administration and managerialism (Parker, 2011).  
To ensure the managerial approach was embedded within Australian university 
management culture, the Australian Commonwealth Government introduced a national set of 
eleven governance protocols for universities under th  Higher Education Support Act of 2003 
(Australian Government, 2003). The push towards a corporate model through theses protocols 
was also influenced by ongoing Commonwealth education reforms that required university 
management to be more ‘business like’ in its approach.  
The spirit of the protocols was to increase the accountability and responsibility of council 
members towards stakeholders. This was against a backdrop where stakeholders required some 
form of assurance from council members who were nowoperationally managing a university that 
is exposed to increased risk.   
 
Risk management – an overview 
The risk management practices of organisations have evolved over the years. Bernstein 
(1996) traces the concept of risk back to the 13th and 14th century, recognising that we all 
practiced risk management at some point of time, whether as individuals or as business managers 
and are still practicing this same concept of risk management. It however takes different forms 
due to different impacts resulting from diverse organisational, disciplinary and methodological 
settings (Renn, 1998). This is based on the concept of risk being defined as the uncertainty of the 
event, the consequences of the outcome, and the benefit of warding off the threat of that risk 
(Cleary and Malleret, 2007). It is argued that thisconcept of an anticipated threat and the need to 
create the desired future as a result of managing this threat under complex organisational 
operations has taken risk management to new heights in the governance of organisations.  
From a historical perspective on the implementation of risk management in organisations, 
the literature reveals that in general risk management was practiced in organisations in the 1980s 
by managing risk in ‘silos’ through insurance management and controlling transaction risk. This 
was gradually moved to a level of professionalism that recognised risk management as more 
sophisticated, complex and involving other sub disciplines of risk (such as strategic, operational , 
financial, business continuity, reputational, etc) which were required to be integrated with broad 
corporate governance responsibilities (Selim and McNamee, 1999). This change in the level of 
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complexity had led to different approaches to risk management. Prominent in these approaches 
was the emergence of the concept of enterprise risk management and the recognition of factors 
associated with its implementation (Beasley et al, 2005; Moeller, 2007). This level of complexity 
and the need to consider every facet of operations was further highlighted by Hoffman (2002), 
who identified billions of dollars lost annually by organisations through operational risks not 
adequately managed. As the name suggests, enterprise isk management involves every facet of 
an organisations operations from the board level to the operational level. Risk management was 
soon regarded as a profession of its own and its importance gained specific prominence when it 
was integrated with corporate governance principles and managed through professional risk 
management departments (Froot et al, 1994; Lam, 2003; Chapman, 2006). Working risk 
management frameworks to assist with the operationalization of risk management were 
subsequently developed that integrated risk management with strategic planning and internal 
controls (e.g. Standards Australian and Standards New Zealand Standard 4360, 2004; COSO 
ERM framework, 2004, Moeller, 2007). These standards were superseded by ISO 31000 
(ISO/DIS 310000, 2009), the first global risk management standard released in early 2009.   
 
Theoretical framework - A collective action model of institutional innovation  
The study focuses on the implementation of a new managerial concept and process, risk 
management. The implementation of this process depends on the views of different actors that 
may have conflicting views on risk management.  Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2006) collective 
action model of institutional innovation is used as a theoretical framework for this study as it 
considers the impact of these different views in the implementation process. The model views 
institutional change or innovation as a dialectical process in which partisan actors espousing 
conflicting views confront each other and engage in political behaviours to create and change 
institutions. We prefer this model over other models in the (neo) institutional literature given that 
the latter mainly focuses on how institutional arrangements are adopted and diffused, and have 
been relatively silent about institutional innovation, or the generative process of collective action 
through witch innovative processes are implemented.    
Before proceeding to outline the characteristics of the model in detail, the terms 
institution, institutional arrangement and institutional innovation as used in the description of the 
model are defined in the context of this study. The term institution refers to an institutional 
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arrangement, and in the context of this study refers to risk management practices (Hurwicz, 
1993). Institutional arrangements may apply to a single institutional actor (one university) or to 
an industry or population (all public universities n Australia). We consider the implementation of 
risk management practices as institutional change. Given that this change is a novel or 
unprecedented departure from the past (in most universities, there was no formal risk 
management in the past), it represents a so-called institutional innovation (Hargrave and Van de 
Ven, 2006). In the following sections the various components of the model are outlined.    
Hargrave and Van de Ven’s (2006) model is firstly characterized by drivers of 
institutional changes such as conflict, power and politics in explaining institutional innovation.  
They argue that conflict is the core generating mechanism of change, power is a necessary 
condition for the expression of conflict, and political strategies and tactics are the means by 
which parties engage in conflict. These three drivers are further discussed as follows:   
Driving factors 
First, conflict generates new norms and institutions but also stimulates economic 
development. People within an organization need not fear conflict and should welcome it (Coser, 
1957). Conflict is a source of creativity that enables institutional change (Commons, 1950).  
Second, power means that organizations’ institution-building is not always driven by 
efficiency considerations nor even by the desire to gain legitimacy among members of the 
organizational field. Rather, action is driven by the desire to maintain power or to appear 
legitimate in the eyes of those who control the organization’s resources (Hargrave and Van de 
Ven, 2006).  
Third, scholars have presented rich descriptions of political strategies and tactics used by 
institutional entrepreneurs to effect institutional change. To build their theoretical model, 
Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) picked out a few interpretations that can also be used in this 
study. They refer to Alinsky (1971) and Fligstein (1997) who refer to attack, confrontation and 
manipulation as political tactics, whereas Warren (2001) focuses more on cooperation and 
compromise. Lindblom (1965) also includes negotiation as an important political strategy. He 
distinguished three types of negotiation: (1) discus ion when one can only appeal to the other; (2) 
bargains when one can effectively make a threat or pr mise; and (3) reciprocity when mutual 
obligations exists.  
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The institutional change process itself 
 Complementary to these driving factors, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) also identified 
three specific characteristics of the institutional change process itself. The first characteristic 
refers to institutional change as involving framing contest meaning that opposing actors, each 
seeking to achieve its goals struggle against one another to frame and reframe the meanings of 
relevant issues. Collective understandings emerge fom battles over the meaning(s) that are 
constantly under challenge. In this context, Morrill et al. (2003) argue that a dominant frame / 
understanding is seldom a consensual frame and frames re ‘contested terrains’ over control and 
power. Frame settlements are temporary truces to political conflict and struggle among opposing 
coalitions. According to Strang and Bradburn (2001), frames are rarely constructed out of whole 
cloth; they are fabricated from already available repertoires and cultural artifacts.  
The second characteristic refers to institutional entrepreneurs constructing networks of 
complementary players that collectively possess the skills and resources needed to achieve 
success and to enact the institutional arrangements tha  govern action in the organizational field. 
Networks serve as conduits through which new models, concepts and practices diffuse and 
become part of an organization’s repertoire (Campbell, 2002).  Networks enable collective action. 
It is important to note, however, that network construction will fail without directive leadership 
(Warren, 2001).  
The third characteristic refers to institutional innovation as a collective action process that 
emerges from opposing views of actors, each seeking to effect institutional change in order to 
change material conditions and achieve its goals.  In other words, actors attempt to influence and 
change the organizational field. The process of institutional change is often a political process of 
mobilizing campaigns to legitimate a social or techni al innovation. Legitimacy has both 
cognitive and sociopolitical dimensions. Cognitive legitimacy means that an institutional change 
is desirable, proper and appropriate within a widely shared system of norms and values (Scott, 
2001; Stryker, 1994). Sociopolitical legitimacy consists of endorsements and the support of key 
constituents who play key roles in developing and implementing an innovation (Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000; Rao, 2001). In other words, new institutional arrangements gain cognitive 
legitimacy when entrepreneurs or activists succeed in framing their projects as valid, reliable and 
useful. To accomplish this, entrepreneurs and activists must engage in political processes (Rao, 
1998). 
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the theoretical frmework of this study.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Research methodology 
Motivation for case study research  
The study adopts a qualitative approach as it is deemed the most appropriate to explore 
new dimensions of an area not investigated previously (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Taylor an 
Bogdan, 1992). In case of a sensitive subject matter such as the topic in question, individual in-
depth interviews provide a more effective tool and create an environment where participants are 
more likely to express their perceptions more openly a d frankly (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). 
This includes the encouragement of participants to use their own words (Bogdan and Biklen, 
1992). Other advantages of this approach include the encouragement of personal thought, the 
respondent’s attentiveness to questions, and the ability of the interviewer to sense non-verbal 
feedback (Sokolow, 1985).  
 
Selection of universities and interviewees 
In Australia, all 37 public universities are categorized into four groups. Each group is 
characterized by a common set of environmental influe cing forces based on their operating 
structures. The four groups are: (1) the Group of eight Universities (Go8), consisting of eight old 
sandstone universities that are well grounded in both teaching and research; (2) Australian 
Technology Network (ATN) Universities that originated from higher education or technology 
institutions; (3) Australian Regional Universities (ARU), being universities developed to serve 
specific regions. They are significantly more dependent on government funding that the other 
groups; and (4) the Australian Innovative Research Universities (IRU), comprising newer 
universities that adopt a more research focused strategic approach. Samples were selected to 
ensure all groupings were represented by at least two representatives from each category of staff 
members interviewed; these being vice chancellors, senior management staff and Chief Audit 
Executives (CAEs).  
A purposeful sampling approach (Straus and Corbin, 1998) was used to determine the 
three groups of staff to be interviewed. The first group of interviewees comprised nine vice 
chancellors representing 25 percent of the total population of all universities. The underlying 
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purpose of the first group was to obtain views from a group of staff who are ultimately 
responsible as drivers of risk management implementatio  within their universities. The second 
group of interviewees consists of second tier management, more specifically, 14 staff members 
made up of university secretaries/governance executiv s, executive deans of divisions and chief 
financial officers. They represent nine universitie (approximately 25 percent of all Australian 
public universities). The purpose of the second group is to obtain views from a group of second 
tier senior managers who are owners of the process at a division or senior departmental level and 
who can verify the vice chancellors views. The third g oup of interviewees consists of 12 CAEs 
representing 35 percent of all Australian public universities. The rationale for selecting CAEs is 
because of their role of enhancing governance by being an important component of governance 
(IIA, 2002). Some of them are also facilitators of the risk management process. They hold senior 
positions in the organisational structure and through their independent functional role are meant 
to know the governance spectrum of their organisations from an operational perspective. Further 
in combination with the complimentary role they play in providing assurance to management as 
to effectiveness of governance processes including the risk management process it is suggested 
that CAEs are in the best position to provide an independent input as to the risk management 
culture of the organisation. Interview numbers for all three groups were restricted once saturation 
of information was achieved. Interviewees were promised anonymity, and as such the names of 
interviewees or their respective organisations are not identified in this paper. The samples 
selected from all three groups are shown in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Interviewees were guided by semi-structured question  and probing questions were 
followed on from the initial general semi-structured questions. Interviewees were interviewed for 
about an hour at their worksites. The interviews were r corded by tape. 
The analysis process commenced with transcribing the raw data from interview tapes. 
Raw transcripts were then summarised and analysed th matically based on the theoretical 
framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This began with a coding process using the ‘open 
coding’ technique (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The wole process of coding, pattern matching 
etc. was facilitated by utilising the Nvivo software package. In particular, the software was useful 
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in compiling an interview summary for each theme (a collation of all interviewee’s responses 
relative to a theme) which facilitated comparative analysis of a participant’s responses.   
 
Secondary data 
In addition to the analysis of transcripts along the above lines, an analysis of secondary 
data was also conducted in parallel thus further cor ob rating the data on a continuous basis. 
Textual secondary data from the university web sites and supporting documents provided by 
interviewees were analysed using the same techniques as utilised in the analysis of transcripts. 
Examples of such secondary data used in the corroborating and supporting analysis included risk 
management structures, risk management frameworks and policies and procedures relative to risk 
management. The dual process facilitated further rigour and strength in the data gathering and 
analysis phase.   
  
Empirical findings  
The results reveal a number of key decision makers (actors) in the university sector 
responsible for driving and implementing risk management practices in the Australian public 
sector.  These actors through a process of conflict via political strategies and collective action in 
the context of Hargraves and Van de Ven’s model have generated the change process towards 
implementing risk management practices. The interviews identified these actors as comprising of 
external and internal actors. The first external actor is the Commonwealth Government, the main 
stakeholder. The Commonwealth Government has influeced the operations of universities 
through policies that have reduced a dependence on government funding, encouraged universities 
to be globally competitive and venture into activities to generate their own funds. They have also 
encouraged universities to take on a corporate appro ch in managing their operations. These 
changes to the operating structure involve risk and require a greater level of accountability from 
university management. The Commonwealth Government in pursuing their policy towards a 
corporate culture in public universities had introduced a number of governance protocols to 
enhance the increased level of accountability requid of university management. One of these 
protocols requires management to develop appropriate sk management practices. The second 
external actor is the governance guidelines and risk management standards (e.g. ASX, 2007; ISO 
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31000) that influence universities in adopting similar best practice guidelines relative to risk 
management.     
  Within the university, there are a number of inter al actors. The main internal actor is the 
university council which comprise of a number of council members. They have ultimate authority 
and accountability for university operations and have  responsibility of executing government 
policy requirements. In relation to the implementation of risk management practices, they do this 
through a sub-committee of council normally referred to as the risk management committee. 
While council members are generally concerned with implementing risk management at the 
conceptual level, they delegate responsibility to the vice chancellor (VC) as the chief executive 
officer (CEO) of the university, to ensure the process is implemented at the operational level.  
Hence, the CEO is another important actor. Further actors identified as taking on the 
responsibility to manage the risk management process at the implementation stage include the 
chief audit executive (CAE), heads of departments ad external service providers.  
The concept of conflict as played out among the actors varies with each university as the 
actors use their power, political strategies and tactics to generate different outcomes in the change 
process. In relation to ‘power’, council members use their powers actively to ensure risk 
management practices are driven by council. In most universities, these practices are driven 
through their delegated officer, the vice chancellor. In relation, to political strategies and tactics, 
the results of the study illustrate Australian public universities are focussing more on cooperation 
and compromise between the actors (Warren,2001) to arrive at a suitable outcome, that is risk 
management practices are considered as satisfactorily implemented. There were also outcomes of 
risk management practices in certain universities that were perceived by interviewees as not 
satisfactory implemented.   
This observation is illustrated through the following three themes as to the status of 
development and implementation of the risk management process.  They are: (1) risk 
management is perceived as being satisfactorily managed through different structural and 
functional set ups; (2) risk management (irrespectiv  of its structural and functional set ups) is 
not adequately managed; and (3) there are differencs in the level of development and 
implementation of the risk management process due to the various actors being influenced 
differently by a number of wider influencing forces that impact on the governance paradigm of 
universities.   
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These three themes are discussed in the context of the theoretical model adopted in this 
study: 
 
Risk Management is perceived as being satisfactorily managed through a number of 
structural and functional set ups. 
 
Performed by internal audit 
This theme is the result of a dominant influence in the conflict process by the chief audit 
executive (CAE) of each university. Some of these CAEs have taken a proactive role in 
recognizing the synergy created through their role in internal audit in ensuring appropriate risk 
management practices are developed in the organization. To maintain their independence as an 
internal auditor, they limit their role as a facilitator of the risk management process rather than 
being involved in the operations of the process. Individual managers of departments take on the 
role as the owners of the process, thus it is their responsibility to ensure risk is identified and 
managed in line with an established process facilitted by the internal audit function. Many of 
these chief audit executives have hence raised their profile and hierarchical position within the 
university with many of them having their position redesignated as Director, Audit and Risk 
Management.  Vice Chancellors as CEOs have responded positively to this power struggle by 
chief audit executives, accepting that risk management is best coordinated through the internal 
audit department. They are of the view that the intrnal audit department is most appropriate to 
undertake the process given its synergy with risk management and stressed that internal audit still 
maintained its independence by reporting to the vicchancellor administratively and to the audit 
committee functionally. The comments of VC of U3 reflected the common sentiment of 
interviewees relative to this observation:     
“Risk management is handled by our internal audit team. The internal auditor reports to me for 
standard matters including risk management. When I became vice chancellor, internal audit used 
to report to the finance director. That was a conflict.  One of my first decisions was they report to 
me. But all governance related activities they repot t  the chancellor. They report to me for 
operating purposes. But their reports are to council. So they have independence. They report to 
the audit committee and they report to me for operation l purposes.  I am very respectful of that 
line”. 
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The operational and reporting processes relative to risk management carried out by 
internal audit functions however varied across universities. In the context of Hargraves and Van 
de Ven’s model, the implementation of risk management at the operational level in each 
university is reflected through different ‘frames’ that is each frame is due to the different levels of 
influence generated by the chief audit executives. They chief audit executives ranged in level of 
professionalism with of them taking risk management to he level where it is integrated with 
strategic planning and the budgeting process. This ‘frame’ of delivery is strongly influenced by 
the existing ISO 31000 risk management standard but its actual implementation involves a 
version of the standard determined through framing contests, where actors negotiate to arrive at a 
certain frame of delivery (example: CAEs as facilitators of the process negotiate with managers 
of departments as owners of the process and the CEO as the driver of the process to arrive at a 
certain frame of delivery).  VC of U8 provided insights as to the more common version of this 
‘frame’ through which risk management practices are carried out and stressed the essence of it 
was to cover all types of possible risk:  
“…Within my section, we have one officer who is not the risk manager for the university but who 
is the risk management co-ordinator. We have a formal risk management policy and we have a 
separate risk management committee. It's a subcommittee of the senate and it is separate from 
our audit committee. We saw it as beneficial and necessary to have a separate risk management 
committee. We place the responsibility for risk management on all managers across the 
university. The risk management coordinator has designed the framework. We've actually 
designed a… we've developed an enterprise risk management software system. It's an in house 
development and that enables us to review the strategic and the operational risk management 
exercises that are done each year. One of the roles f the risk management coordinator is to 
collate the various reports that come in.  That's monitored rather well. Whilst we do carry out a 
review of the effectiveness of the overall enterprise sk management there's really a need to be 
properly independent, so we have an external review carried out every so often”. 
 
The CAE of U4 reflected on another ‘frame’ in which risk management is carried out:    
“I look after the risk management framework. With regards the operational aspects, for 
independence reasons, I don't touch the insurance portfolio. I don't do safety and workers' comp 
and legal is done outside because we've got a university council. But I do have a say in how 
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things get squared away. My internal auditors don't do risk management and my risk 
management people don't do internal audit. The separation of duties within the staffing and the 
fact that an independent peer review was done enhanced the independence requirement”.   
 
Outsourced functions  
In universities where CAEs have not taken on a proactive role and being an ‘actor’ in the 
conflict process, vice chancellors have used their influence in the conflict process among the 
actors to outsource the risk management function. This process inevitably invites another 
participant to the negotiation process, the outside ervice provider. The process at the operational 
level is hence ‘framed’ differently as these outsourced functions have their own approaches 
towards risk management. VC of U9 expressed the common sentiment of VC’s:   
“We outsource ours to Deloitte and we have people who are strong risk managers. For example 
next week I'm running a risk workshop with our audit and risk committee and some of our key 
executives. We're going through all the university' risks for three hours. They do all the support 
for it.  But at the end of the day it's my responsibility. I couldn't say there's anything wrong with 
Deloitte at all but they put some structure around it for us. They're trying to give us some 
direction and some structure and making sure we ident fy the key risks”. 
 
  The CAE of U2, whose university has an outsourced isk management function, described 
the status of this process:  
“The risk management position is under contract. They were here full time for a couple of years 
to implement the risk management strategy for the university. A risk management framework was 
established. There are the risk registers and the risk treatment plans which have been developed 
in the last couple of years. They are now an electronic system, automated system, every year 
responsible people are told to update their risk for their particular area. The risk manager 
ensures that this automated process is carried out annually and to date, there are improvements. 
I’ve prepared a report on – there are still weaknesses in there. But generally it’s effective, and 
what I’ve seen is that in general, the critical risks that have been identified at the operational 




Separate department within the university 
Some Vice chancellors have used their influence to keep the risk management function 
managed by a separate department within the university. This approach is to some extent 
influenced by heads of specific departments who have successfully negotiated with their vice 
chancellors to take on the additional responsibility of implementing the process. These separate 
departments were reported to range from the finance and business office, the university’s 
secretariat’s office, and the planning office. The US of U2 justified it as part of the secretariat’s 
responsibilities and provided a description of its structure and the service provided, thus 
providing another ‘frame’ in which risk management is managed operationally. They seem to 
take it quite seriously with an external expert sitting on the committee as an assessor:    
“…I think risk management is very much part of the secretariat’s responsibilities. We have a risk 
assessment and management policy as a part of the handbook. And we have a risk manager. 
We’ve designed and implemented a web based risk recording process which links the various 
risks to various areas of the university. We have a risk management committee of senate, which is 
separate from the audit committee because we take the view that risk is the responsibility of 
management and the executive takes responsibility for risk management. We have an external 
expert who joins the committee as an assessor to keep us on the straight and narrow. We have a 
process that we go through which reviews the top ten corporate risks. We manage those in terms 
of the normal process of how likely is the risk to occur, what are the consequences if it does 
occur, what are the mitigating controls and action plans that you need to put in place to manage 
and control that risk and what is the residual risk? Then we cascade that through all our 
operational plans.  Each of the business units is required to identify the top five risks in its area 
and to present them in the same way. That’s recorded in the risk register. Then once a year we 
look at our statutory obligations register. There are a hundred and sixty separate legal or 
statutory instruments with which we have to comply.  Each of the managers responsible in that 
area have to sign off that we’re compliant.  We’ve be n quite systematic as to how we go about 
managing corporate risk”.   
 
The CAE of U6 provided his justification on why risk management was to be within the 
planning office and not internal audit:  
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“Risk management is part of the planning office. It’s been part of the planning office for a 
number of years.  It was something that I was keen to see occur. My view is it should never be 
with internal audit. If you look at standards for risk management, it all should be feeding into the 
business planning and budgetary processes. So… logically therefore it stays with the university 
planning office. They’re the ones who coordinate thpreparation in conjunction with the 
business divisions, the business plans.  So they coordinate as part of that planning process the 
risk management aspects of that. We have been playing a reasonably hands-on role. So we 
haven’t done a review. It’s still maturing. It’s one of those things where improvement can always 
take place”.   
  
Risk Management is not adequately managed/still relatively new 
The other major theme emerging was that the risk management process is still not 
adequately implemented. Here the participants (actors normally responsible for driving the 
process operationally such as the VC and the CAE) indicated that in their universities, aspects of 
risk management were relatively new. The concept of conflict was still in progress and had not 
reached a stage where a firm outcome was reached as to the risk management process to be 
implemented. VC of U5 indicated that it was a new function to his university undertaken by the 
internal audit function and there were still questions being asked on its value and how it was to be 
addressed in a university setting. VC of U8 provided information that it is in a transitionary stage 
of having the function coordinated by the internal audit department. While the process was  
initiated a few years ago by a contract risk management position, consensus has been obtained 
among the main players that it will now be addressed through a newly appointed Director for 
Risk and Internal Audit. Here the participants in the conflict process have been influenced by 
other universities who have had their risk management function successfully coordinated by their 
CAEs. The position will oversee both the internal audit and risk function. 
“…We’ve got a risk officer and we’ve got internal auditors as a separate function. I think we’ve 
just agreed that we are going to have someone sit above them who will be responsible for risk 
management as well as internal audit. I think the risk management person will be out there, and 
will be discussing within the university and in the framework of the risk management strategy, 
what are the most significant risks, and thus identify how we manage those risks” 
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Other respondents were of the view that risk management was not as yet effectively 
addressed in their respective universities. In this case, interviewees described the conflict process 
in line with Hargrave and Van de Ven’s model as still in progress with no clear outcome as yet. 
Interviewees described the negotiation process between the facilitator (CAE), owners 
(departmental heads) and the driver (CEO) of the process as still taking place given that it is still 
a new innovative product to be implemented.  The statu  of development of risk management 
practices in these cases was often referred to as underdeveloped, work in progress or room for 
improvement. VC’s of U4 and U7 were of the view that it was underdeveloped as a process. VC 
of U4 stated: 
“Well, that is really underdone in a formal way, and it is an example of where universities in my 
opinion, are probably behind the private sector in relation to risk management. So I think that 
from our point of view, we are slow in completing that process”.   
 
VC of U7 felt they needed to improve risk management, particularly its linkages with the 
strategic plan: 
 “The area that we need to beef up a bit more and we're doing right now is that the risk plan (the 
risk assessment) has to directly relate to strategy more than it is.  I think that's a thing we haven't 
done well yet”.   
 
The views of vice chancellors were supported by the second tier management group. They 
provided examples of shortcomings in the risk management processes. The ED of U2 stated:   
“…the biggest risk management I think is offshore international students which we haven’t 
addressed yet. Some universities have been affected while other universities have been fortunate 
that they haven't really had the whistle blown on them as yet”. 
 
The CFO of U2 similarly while confirming its importance as a governance process, 
indicated that risk management in U2 was still being worked on. The CFO of U6 similarly also 
confirmed that it is a new process with a long way to go:  
“I think that nobody would argue that, until recently, risk management has not really happened. I 
think it is something that the University has picked up on at the end of 2006 and has been 
working on subsequently in terms of developing a risk management plan and various local plans 
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around risk management. And certainly, some of them I a  very wary how it has been developed. 
I think there is a way to go before it is in place, and before it is part of the culture.  So I think 
there is a way to go on that.  But it is certainly the direction that the university is heading into”.   
 
Two CAE’s further supported the view that risk management was not undertaken 
satisfactorily and required further improvements. The CAE of U1 stated: 
“Risk management hasn't been something that has been v ry important to the university, because 
perhaps the previous management didn't think it was important, because we're in an environment 
with lots of money; when things went wrong, we could fix them up easily. So there are issues like 
its sustainability that is going to be an issue.  Funding sources are linked to that. There are other 
types of business risks that we haven't thought about managing before, quality of staff, 
availability of staff in a resources boom etc. So the governance framework has to be firmed up so 
that these sorts of things can be dealt with in a systematic way”. 
 
The CAE of U3 stated: 
“We have a separate risk manager. He sits within the finance and business services unit. But his 
focus has been more around insurance than risk management.  While the emphasis of managing 
risk is on the managers, we don't have is the tools f r them to actually formally document… 
identify, document and monitor their risks”.   
 
Reasons for variances in development of risk management processes of universities 
Respondents provided other reasons as to how the concept of conflict, power and political 
strategies as played out by the various identified actors influenced the outcomes. They asserted 
that each university is subject to a different management culture resulting from different levels of 
political strategies and tactics played out by the various identified actors. This different culture in 
turn had an impact on the risk management culture. Th  vice chancellors explained that the risk 
management culture was influenced by council in the first instance and hence its successful 
implementation depended very much on the character of university council members which 
varied with universities. This common sentiment of all participants is reflected through the 
comments of VC of U1: 
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“….I find with the development of risk practices in a university it’s actually a very interesting 
conjunction with the corporate character of university boards and senates. There is a strong 
influence if the senate or council is composed of business people and they understand risk 
management.” 
 
A positive influence by council on risk management practices is normally reflected 
through the formation of an appropriate risk management committee as a sub committee of 
university council. Many universities had this function also linked with the audit committee. The 
committee was responsible for an oversight role on the operations of risk management 
undertaken through a number of means. This accountability structure is influenced by agency 
theory principles of governance (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and meckling, 1976) and 
pressure from the Commonwealth Government through its policies for a more corporate approach 
to management. In the absence of mandatory guidelines i  this area, the results indicate that 
universities through the process of conflict, power and political strategies amongst its key actors 
were drawing on institutional theory characteristics to imitate various risk management practices 
of the corporate sector. The most popular of these means was delivering the risk management 
process through the internal audit function. This was followed by separately formed risk 
management departments that reported to a range of operational divisions. A minority had their 
risk management function outsourced.    
Another reason provided for the different levels of development of the risk management 
process was the different levels of influencing forces universities were subjected to and to which 
the actors as important decision makers within the university system had to consider. 
Respondents explained that while Australian public universities were subject to common 
Commonwealth Government policy directions (such as an encouragement towards a corporate 
culture), they were also subject to a further set of common influencing forces which had different 
levels of impacts on the management and risk culture of universities.  
One of these forces was described as being due to a university’s geographical location. 
Australian public universities are incorporated in a State or Territory in which they are located 
and are consequently subject to local acts and regulations which differ between states. Some of 
these different local acts and regulations provide a different emphasis on financial management 
compliance regulations, council and management structures, council composition and governance 
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accountabilities. These different accountabilities at the State and Territory levels invariably have 
different levels of emphasis on the level of development and implementation of governance 
processes such as the risk management process. Specific r quirements under each State or 
Territory financial regulations also stipulate how university funds can be used, invested or spent 
for operations. They also specify the borrowing capacity. These guidelines invariably impact on 
the level of risk that can be taken and the extent of their corporate risks. Universities are also 
accountable to a variety of stakeholders inclusive of the local community and industry and its risk 
taking activities have to take the interests of these extended stakeholders. These levels of 
influences are not consistent across the sector, hence they impact on council and/or the vice 
chancellor generating different forms of views during the conflict, power and political strategies 
stage as outlined in Hargrave and Van de Ven’s model. 
Another influencing force on the management culture of universities was described as the 
collegial managerialism and autonomy culture of academics. This culture was described as being 
in tension with the corporate culture universities are pursuing and consequently has had a 
negative impact on the development of corporate governance processes such as the risk 
management process. The degree of tension is describ d as being more prevalent in older 
universities and this scenario has an impact on acceptance and compliance of risk management 
practices at the operational level. They particularly impact on managers of units who are owners 
of the risk management process and many of these are academics. The CAE of Aus U3 
commented on this common view by all three groups of staff members:  
“All the academics that were around in the days of free education and the more open and less 
compliant environment see the shift to entrepreneurial control processes as counter to the basis 
principles of the university. The younger academics coming through are more receptive”.  
 
These tensions are supported by various studies. Parker (2011) refers to newer 
universities adopting corporate processes more easily that older universities which were 
accustomed to a more guild based collegial tradition of decision making and generally took 
longer to adapt to corporate processes.  In essence, the needs of academics as important 
stakeholders of universities are recognized differently in a university’s governance framework 
and consequently are addressed differently.  
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A further influencing force was described as the changing internal management culture of 
universities. University staff members were undergoin  a change from a public sector culture to a 
corporate culture. The rate of change in internal mnagement to cope with the changing culture 
differed between universities and consequently had also an impact on the development and 
implementation of governance processes. This includes the risk management culture. VC of U7 
commented on this common sentiment that Australian universities with a public sector 
background were generally risk averse, and adopted management practices that were generally 
incompatible with an entrepreneurial culture and its associated governance control processes like 
risk management:   
“I think if you were to do a risk rating on universities the prevailing culture is risk averse. The 
public sector background is one part of that where th y haven't had a culture of generating 
whatever they need to do to continue to do what they do. It's been a world where it's just been 
there and we've just done it. There isn't generally speaking an organisational preponderance for 
entrepreneurialism, it's just not there.  But there are some people in the university that are 
spectacularly entrepreneurial in their area and have great ideas and the university's 
superstructure doesn't cope well with them.  So that's a tension”.   
 
The respondents were indicating that the professionalism of administrative staff to deal 
with corporate processes differed between universiti s. The needs to professionalize 
administrative staff, as employees and important stakeholders, were recognized differently by 
universities in their governance framework. Hence, adoption of risk management practices 
varied. Nagy and Robb (2008 p 1423) referred to the scenario of some Australian universities that 
lacked the required level of professionalism in its administration as being “littered with the debris 
of poor executive control in the climate of increasd managerial and entrepreneurial activities”.     
A final influencing force was described as the different levels of global competition that 
impacted on the governance paradigms of universities. Interviewees indicated that universities 
reacted to global competition differently. An aspect of global competition was the heavy 
dependency on an extended stakeholder base through international activities. The level of 
stakeholders would increase to include offshore partners, students, researchers, governments, etc. 
The implications are that there is a wider stakeholder base as a result of globalization and their 
interests need to be recognized within the university’s governance framework. Interviewees 
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explained that this dependence on a wider stakeholdr base varied with universities and the 
associated risk and development of risk management practices also varied in line with this 
dependence. The CAE of Aus U1 explains this common se timent that required certain 
universities which relied on international student fees income to develop appropriate risk 
management strategies to address the associated risk of losing that income:    
“A quarter of our income comes from overseas students a d these students are predominantly 
from two or three countries. There is considerable risk if we lose these markets due to change in 
government policies towards overseas students or due to the very heavy competition. There is an 
onus on management in this case to develop appropriate risk management strategies”. 
 
The lack of some universities not recognizing risks associated with embarking on 
international activities is reflected through closure of  a campus at a cost of tens of million of 
dollars just months after its opening, poor management of a university’s private corporation arm 
and losses made by universities in their attempts to nurture partnerships overseas (Nagy and 
Robb, 2008). 
The implications of not recognizing risk associated with a wider stakeholder base 
attributable to the different wider influencing forces is that universities are not recognizing them 
within their governance framework and adapting control processes to appropriately address them. 
It is argued that this is due to universities concentrating on the government as its main 
stakeholder and principal under an agency oriented governance framework. Other stakeholders 
resulting from these wider influencing forces, their interest and the risk of activities associated 
them, were not recognized and addressed through the univ rsity’s governance framework on a 
consistent basis. Hence the different levels of development and implementation of risk 
management processes. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study critically examined the implementation of risk management in the Australian 
public university sector by applying Hargrave and Van de Ven’s collective action model of 
institutional innovation. The study identified actors external and internal to the university system 
that on embarking through a process of conflict, powers and political strategies amongst them, 
resulted in various frames of risk management impleented at the operational level.    
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Amidst this various frames of delivery of risk management practices, a major theme was 
that respondents perceived their risk management prac ices as being satisfactory. The perception 
of satisfactory risk management practices were supported by a description of a risk culture that 
was initiated by the top hierarchy through a council appointed audit and/or risk management 
committee which had an oversight role of risk management. At the operational level, the analysis 
of the interviewees indicated different platforms. Some indicated that risk management was 
managed or coordinated through their respective intrnal audit functions, while other indicated 
that it was outsourced or managed by a separate dedicat  risk management function under a 
range of divisions such as the university secretariat, planning office and finance office. The 
common processes described as in place at the operati nal level included development and 
implementation of risk management operational policies, risk management frameworks, 
coordination of compliance with such frameworks and periodic reporting of identified risks and 
management of such risks to the respective oversight committees. Such a frame of delivery was 
influenced by existing standards in risk management ( xample ISO 31000).  
A second consistent theme emerging from the three goups of staff members was that 
some universities still did not have adequate risk management practices in place. A common 
reason for this was they were still underdeveloped. Here, it was suggested that the identified 
actors who have gone through a process of conflict, powers and political strategies in line with 
Hargraves and Van de Ven;s model, had still not reach d an acceptable consensus, or the 
accepted consensus was still considered by the actors as ‘work in progress’. 
A third theme was that irrespective of whether they were appropriately developed or not, 
risk management practices were in various stages of development and implementation across the 
sector. Some had reached a sophisticated level of integrating risk management with the strategic 
planning and budgeting processes; some were still in he work in progress stage and some did not 
have any risk management process in place at all. These different outcomes resulting from the 
conflict, power and political strategies played outby the actors was described as also due to a 
wider set of influencing forces that impacted on the governance paradigms of each university and 
invariably on the actors identified in this study. These being the government, council, vice 
chancellors, chief audit executives, heads of certain departments that have taken on the risk 
management function and owners of the risk management process. These influences were 
described as being due to; local acts and related regulations which varied among States and 
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Territories; different levels of tension between a university’s collegial and autonomous 
management practices and the practices of a corporate culture; different levels of tension between 
the inherited public sector management culture and its corporate culture; different approaches to 
managing risk under the impact of global competition under a risk averse public sector culture 
and the risk taking culture of entrepreneurial manageri lism. It is argued that these influences are 
linked to a wider stakeholder base whose contractual obligations are not fully recognized within 
an agency oriented governance framework (Aguilera, t l., 2008; Filatotchev, 2008; Christopher, 
2010). As a consequence appropriate governance control mechanisms and processes such as risk 
management are not fully developed and implemented i  certain universities to address them. 
In summary the findings of the study confirms the toretical propositions of Hargraves 
and Van de Ven’s model and illustrates how various actors in the university sector frame issues, 
mobilize collective actions, and engage in contested processes in order to achieve different 
outcomes in the implementation of risk management. The study has provided insights of a further 
dimension of causes for these different levels of development and implementation of risk 
management practices, this being the impact of an organization’s wider influencing forces on the 
governance paradigm and consequently the various drivers and owners of the process. This 
observation leads to the following theoretical proposition to be further tested: universities need to 
take into account an organization’s wider influencing forces in developing its governance 
framework and address them to minimize tensions or conflicts in developing and implementing 
its governance processes. 
 
This study has made incremental contributions to the university governance and risk management 
literature, and specifically towards understanding how risk management is implemented in the 
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Figure 1 : A Collective Action Model of Institutional Change 
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Table 1: Overview of Universities and Interviewees 
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U1    X  1     
U2   X   1     
U3 X      1   1 
U4  X        1 
U5    X  1  1 1 1 
U6   X    1 1 1 1 
U7 X         1 
U8  X        1 
U9 X         1 
U10   X     1  1 
U11  X    1  1   
U12 X     1 1   1 
U13 X     1    1 
U14    X  1  1  1 
U15  X    1  1 1 1 
U16   X   1 1  1  
           
Total interviewees Phase 1:   23      9 4 6 4  
Total Interviewees Phase 2:   12          12 
 
